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1 Introduction 
The financial structure of a firm is one of the most critical areas in corporate 
finance that can affect the whole operations of a firm (Wen et al. 2002; Abor 
& Bikpie 2005; Abor & Bikpie 2007). One of the basic motives of capital 
structure management is to reduce the cost of capital to maximize the 
shareholders’ wealth. Studies on firm’s financial structure can be traced 
back to the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), were they opined 
that the capital structure of a firm was irrelevant in determining the firm’s 
value and its future performance. Since the proclamation of Modigliani and 
Miller in 1958, several theories have been developed to explain firms’ 
financing decisions. One of such theories that have gained strong empirical 
support is the agency theory. The theory posits that capital structure is 
determined by agency costs arising from conflicts of interest. Since then, 
discussions on firms’ financial decisions have continued to be an issue of 
interest in the finance literatures. According to Jiraporn (2009), capital 
structure is one of the most puzzling topics in corporate finance literature. It 
is often referred to as a firm's financial framework. Booth, Aivazian, 
Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic (2001) described it as the mix of debt and 
equity capital maintained by a firm. It is also seen a mixture of a variety of 
long term sources of funds and equity shares including reserves and 
surpluses of an enterprise. An important decision of a firm is the choice 
between shareholders' equity and debt. Thus, a firm's financial framework 
(capital structure) is the specific combination of its debt and shareholders' 
equity for funding its operation activities. Therefore, financial decisions 
affecting firm’s capital structure are very salient among firms based on the 
need to increase investors' return on investment and the economic 
corporation ability to deal with a competitive environment. Hence, the 
capital structure of a firm is very important since it related to the ability of 
the firm to meet the needs of its stakeholders.  
Corporate governance on the other hand is the mechanism and philosophy 
that entails the processes and structure which facilitate the creation of 
shareholder value through the management of an organisation affair to 
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ensure the protection of the individual and collective interest of all the 
stakeholders. According to Keasey et al (1997), it is the process and 
structure used to direct and manage the affairs of a company towards 
enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the ultimate 
objective of realizing long-term shareholder value, whilst taking into 
account the interest of other stakeholders. It is generally associated with the 
existence of agency problem and its roots can be traced back to separation of 
ownership and control of the firm. Agency problems arise as a result of the 
relationships between shareholders and managers and are based on conflicts 
of interest within the firm. Hence, corporate governance basically exists to 
provide the necessary checks and balances between shareholders and 
management and thus to mitigate agency problems. Hence, firms with better 
governance quality should suffer less agency conflicts.   
Although, many studies such as (Jensen 1986; Mehran 1992; Bathala et al. 
1994; Berger et al. 1997; Friend & Lang 1998; Wiwattanakantang 1999; 
Wen et al. 2002; Anderson & Reeb 2003; Abor & Bikpie 2005; Abor 2007; 
Hussainey & Al-Nodel 2009; Al-Najjar & Hussaeny 2009) have been 
conducted to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and 
the capital structure decisions of firms, yet different results were reported. 
Therefore, based on the nexus arising from previous studies; the need for an 
investigation of the relationship between corporate governance variables and 
the capital structure decisions of listed firms in Nigeria becomes imperative. 
To this end therefore, motivated by the assumption of the agency theory, 
this study basically investigated the relationship between corporate 
governance variables and the capital structure decisions of listed firms in 
Nigeria. 
To gain more insight into this paper, the study has been organized as 
follows. Following the introduction is the section 2 which presents a 
detailed review of relevant literatures and hypotheses development. While 
section 3 focused on the research methodology adapted for the study; 
section 4 and 5 discusses the findings and the conclusion of study. 
SCOPE OF STUDY 
This study basically examined the relationship between corporate 
governance and capital structure decisions of listed firms in Nigeria. 
However, based on the availability of data for the study, the following 
corporate governance variables were considered (board size, CEO duality, 
board composition and managerial ownership) while debt to equity ratio was 
adopted as the criterion for capital structure. To accomplish this objective, 
the annual report for the period 2006 -2011 was analyzed. In addition, the 
study considered a total of 40 listed firms in the Nigerian stock exchange 
market. The choice of the selected firms’ arises based on the capital 
structure and the equity ownership structure of the listed firms. 
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2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
The impact of corporate governance practice among firms differs from country to 
country as a result of the differences arising from the social, economic, and 
regulatory conditions that exit in different countries (Rouf, 2011). Similarly, this is 
also the case with firms’ financial leverage as its impact on the value of firms also 
differs from country to country due to the dissimilarity in tax brackets and tax laws 
of different countries. However, corporate governance as a concept is a key factor 
in improving the value of a firm. It basically indicates how firms are managed, 
guided and controlled; and deals with supervision, accountability, guidance, and 
management control. Although, corporate governance is a growing area in the 
management and finance literature, there have always been controversies among 
scholars when it comes to the issue of corporate governance and firms financing 
decisions on capital structure. So far, empirical evidence on the relationship 
between corporate governance and capitals structure appear to be mixed and 
inconclusive. According to  Aghaee and Chalaki (2009), given the different and 
inconsistent corporate governance structures in different countries which results 
from varying social, economic and legal conditions within them, the links between 
corporate governance and financing decision making are different in financial 
markets of developed and developing countries. 
Berger, Eli and Yermack (1997) examined the relationship between managerial 
entrenchment and firms' capital structures. Results indicate that entrenched CEOs 
make efforts to remain away from debt and gearing ratios remain lower in the 
absence of demand from owners.  
Sotu (2003) studied the relationship between capital structure and corporate 
governance in Malaysia before and after 1997 crisis by using representation costs 
approach. He concluded that a diffuse ownership corporation leads to a weakened 
corporate governance system and a higher financial leverage of the firm. He 
considers the ownership centralization as a factor to reduce interest conflicts 
between directors and owners. A higher quality of corporate governance system 
leads to lower representation costs of internal financing. Thus increasing the 
quality of governance system, external financing is decreased. As a result, there is a 
negative relationship between corporate governance system's quality and the firm's 
financial leverage. Also Abor (2007) in a related study examined the relationship 
between corporate governance and capital structure decisions by taking a sample of 
22 firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) during the six-year period 
(1998-2003). Abor found that capital structure is positively associated with board 
size, board composition, and CEO duality, and negatively associated with CEO 
tenure. 
Antoniou et al. (2008) also conducted a study to investigate how firms operating in 
capital market-oriented economies (the U.K. and the U.S.) and bank-oriented 
economies (France, Germany, and Japan) determine their capital structure. They 
found that capital structure of a firm is heavily influenced by the corporate 
governance practices and exposure to capital markets.  
Saad (2010) also observed that while a negative relationship does exist between 
CEO duality and capital structure of listed firms, a positive relationship was 
observed between board size and capital structure. Similarly, Rehman et al. (2010) 
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investigated the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure of 
randomly selected 19 banks in Pakistan from 2005-2006. They found a positive 
relationship between board size and capital structure. Also, using the data from 
Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) for the period 2005–2010; Vakilifard et al. (2011) 
found a positive relationship between CEO duality and leverage. They also 
observed that a negative relationship exit between board size and leverage. 
Although the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure has 
been the subject for an extensive research in developed countries, the same is not 
true in developing economies like Nigeria. This study therefore tends to fill this 
gap in literature by examing the relationship between corporate governance and 
capital structure of listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
2.1 Development of hypotheses 
The hypotheses to be tested in this study are stated below in their null form: 
1) Ho: There is no significant relationship between board size and the capital 
structure of listed firms in Nigeria. 
2) Ho: There is no significant relationship between CEO duality and the 
capital  structure of listed firms in Nigeria. 
3) Ho: There is no significant relationship between board composition and the 
capital structure of listed firms in Nigeria. 
4) Ho: There is no significant relationship between management ownership 
and the capital structure of listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
3 Research methodology 
To achieve the objectives of this study, the annual report for the period 2006-2011 
were analyzed. The choice of this period arises based on the series of corporate 
frauds arising from firms in Nigeria due to poor corporate governance practice. 
However, using the judgmental sampling technique; a total of 40 listed firms 
operating in high profile industries in the Nigerian Stock Exchange were analysed. 
This represents 20.5% of the total population. This is consistent with the 
propositions of Krejcie & Morgan (1970) where a minimum of 5% of a defined 
population is considered as an appropriate sample size in making generalization. 
The choice of the sampled firms was based on the size, market capitalization and 
the availability of the annual report of the sampled firms. Nevertheless, in testing 
the research hypothesis, the ordinary least square (OLS) was used in the estimation 
of the regression equation under consideration. 
Specifications of the Econometric Model: 
 
The following model is used to examine the association between independent and 
the dependent variables of the listed firms in Nigeria. 
DERit=f(BDSIZEit, CEODUALit, BCOMit, DEIit, eit)……..………………………(1) 
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 This can be written in explicit form as: 
DERit=β0 + β1BDSIZEit + β2CEODUALit + β2BCOMit + β2DEIit + eit……..…..(2)  
Where: 
LEVit=Capital Structure is the dependent variable and it proxied a Leverage (LEV). 
  It is measured as the debt to equity ratio.  
BSIZEit=BOARDSIZE represents the total number of members on the board of 
directors. 
CEODUALit=CEODUALITY is a corporate management situation where the CEO 
also serves as chairman of the board. (i.e., a score of 1if the 
CEO is also the chairman of the board, otherwise 0). 
 
DEIit=Management ownership was measured as the percentage proportion of 
director’s equity interest (DEI) respect to the total stocks. 
 
BCOMit =Board composition represents the proportion of non-executive directors 
on board and it is calculated as the number of non-executive directors 
divided by total number of directors. 
 
e =    Stochastic or disturbance term. 
t =    Time dimension of the Variables  
 
β0 =    Constant or Intercept. 
β1-4 =    Coefficients to be estimated or the Coefficients of slope 
parameters. 
 
The expected signs of the coefficients (i.e. a priori expectations) are such that β1, β3, 
β4 < 0 while β2 > 0. 
 
4 Discussion of Findings 
Findings from the descriptive statistics as shown in table (1) indicate that while the 
debt to equity ratio of (proxied by DER) of the selected firms have an approximate 
mean value of about .46125; on the other hand, board size (BSIZE), CEO duality 
(CEODUAL), management ownership (DEI) and board composition (BCOM) had 
mean values of 10.3, .15, .30325 and .43825 respectively. 
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Results on the correlation matrix for the listed firms are depicted in table (2). The 
table presents a correlation coefficient (r) result for board size (BSIZE) as it relates 
to firm’s debt to equity ratio (DER) to be (-0.6129). This outcome invariably 
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implies that there is a significant negative correlation between board size and the 
capital structure of the selected listed firms. Similarly, the table also presents a 
correlation coefficient (r) results for management ownership (DEI) and board 
composition (BCOM) as it relates to firms debt to equity ratio to be (-0.6503 and -
0.6380) respectively. However, the outcome of the correlation coefficient (r) result 
for CEO duality (CEODUAL) as it relates to firm’s debt to equity ratio (DER) as 
depicted in table (2) was (0.4805). This outcome basically connotes the fact that 
there is a significant positive correlation between board composition and the capital 
structure of the selected listed firms.  
 
Table (4) displays the result of the regression model used to test all the stated 
hypotheses (i.e. H1 -H4). The use of multivariate hypothesis test is based on the 
assumption of no significant multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. 
Thus, to investigate the existence of multicollinearity, the variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) for each of the explanatory variables are computed as depicted table (5). 
The maximum VIF as reported from table (5) is 1.71, which is lower than ten (10), 
a number that is used as a rule of thumb as an indicator of multicollinearity 
problems (Field, 2000; Belsely, 1991). Thus, these results support the lack of 
presence of multicollinearity in the research model. The results of the regression 
analysis can, therefore, be interpreted with a greater degree of confidence.  
 
The results for the goodness of fit test as shown in table (4) present an adjusted R2 
value of about 0.6116.  This in a nutshell means that the value of the dependent 
variable can be explained by about 65% of the independent variables. This value 
can be considered sufficient because the capital structure of a firm can also be 
influenced by other factors beside the corporate governance variables adopted for 
this study. Nevertheless, the F- test statistics as presented in table (3) shows a p-
value that is less than 0.05 (i.e. p-value < 0.05). This outcome suggests clearly that 
simultaneously the explanatory variable (i.e. board size, CEO duality, management 
ownership and board composition) are significantly associated with the dependent 
variable.  
 
Furthermore, a review of the regression analysis results for the sampled firms 
shows that all the outcomes are consistent with our initially stated a priori 
expectations (i.e. b1, b3, b4 < 0 and b2 > 0). Empirical findings show that there is a 
significant negative relationship between board size and the capital structure 
(proxied by DER) of listed firms. This is evident in the probability and        t-values 
of 0.008 and -2.81 respectively. Hence, we accept the null hypothesis and reject the 
alternative hypothesis. This result is in consonance with the findings of Mehran 
(1992), Abor and Biekpe (2005) Berger et al. (1997), Abor (2007) and Hassan and 
Butt (2009) who argued that larger boards prefer low debt levels. They further 
opined that larger boards may emphasize owner-manager to employ more equity 
capital in order to improve firm performance. This outcome implies that larger 
boards may exert pressure on managers to follow lower gearing levels and enhance 
firm performance. That is, firms with larger board sizes tend to use lower debt 
ratios in their capital composition. This outcome however contradicts the findings 
provided in Jensen (1986); Wen et al. (2002) and Coles et al. (2005) were a 
significant positive relationship was observed between board size and debt ratio.  
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Findings for the second hypothesis show that there is a significant positive 
relationship between CEO duality and the capital structure of listed firms in 
Nigeria. This is evident in the probability and t-values of 0.072 and 1.86 
respectively. This outcome basically implies that CEO duality increases firm’s debt 
usage. This is however in line with the stewardship theory which holds that CEO 
duality reduces communication conflicts in an uncertain environment and thus 
creates a clear sense of strategic decision. This result is consistent with the findings 
of Fosberg (2004) and Abor (2007) where they argued that duality leadership firms 
have high debt to equity ratio. Thus, CEO duality in a firm basically reduces the 
problems related to separation of ownership and control and therefore, reduces 
information asymmetry problems. 
 
Also, findings for the second hypothesis show that there is a significant negative 
relationship between management ownership (proxied by DEI) and the capital 
structure of listed firms in Nigeria. This is evident in the probability and t-values of 
0.038 and -2.16 respectively. This result is in line with the findings of (Berger et 
al., 1997; Brailsfors et al., 2002; Fosberg, 2004; Baum et al., 2007) where 
management ownership was observed to have a negative impact on firms’ long-
term debt. Nevertheless, this outcome empirically suggests that high managerial 
discretion limits long-term debt. That is, as the level of managerial ownership 
increases, firm control passes from external shareholders to the managers and after 
a certain period of managerial ownership, managerial entrenchment leads to debt 
avoidance. Moreover, when managers invest larger amounts of their personal 
wealth in a business they became risk-averse and are reluctant to adopt high debt 
policies because of the risk of bankruptcy.  
 
Finally, findings for the fourth hypothesis show that there is also a significant 
negative relationship between board composition and the capital structure of listed 
firms in Nigeria. This is also evident in the probability and t-values of 0.053 and -
2.00 respectively. Thus, based on the role of outside directors as independent 
people who act to decrease the agency problems in a firm, a company where the 
proportion of outside directors is high will have a better monitoring level so as to 
minimize the likelihood of high debt. That is the larger the proportion of outside 
directors, the tighter the control of debt usage in funding the operation of a 
company. Since independent directors serve to directly supervise any sub-optimal 
decisions by the managers, such as decision on company funding resources. Thus 
managers are actively monitored by independent directors to choose lower leverage 
in improving performance. In tandem with the methodological juxtaposition, is 
consistent with the findings of Jensen (1986), Wen et al. (2002) and Al-Najjar & 
Hussainey (2009) where they argued that due to rigorous monitoring by non-
executive directors, managers tend to adopt a lower level of leverage for achieving 
superior results. 
 
5 Conclusion recommendations 
This study basically examined the relationship between corporate governance 
variables and the capital structure decisions of listed firms in Nigeria. The study 
J o u r n a l  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t                      J A M  v o l .  4 ,  n o .  1 ( 2 0 1 4 )  
 
13 
 
came up with the following findings that are of salient importance to scholars 
investigating issues relating to firms’ capital structure decisions in the Nigerian 
context. Result from our determination test indicates that 65% change in capital 
structure decision of firms can be explained by corporate governance variables. 
The study further revealed that while a positive relationship existed between CEO 
duality and the capital structure of listed firms in Nigeria; on the other hand, board 
size, management ownership and board composition had a significant negative 
impact on firms’ capital structure decisions. Thus, based on the findings provided 
in this study, the study concludes that as the level of managerial ownership 
increases, firm control passes from external shareholders to the managers and after 
a certain period of managerial ownership, managerial entrenchment leads to debt 
avoidance. Moreover, when managers invest larger amounts of their personal 
wealth in a business they became risk-averse and are reluctant to adopt high debt 
policies because of the risk of bankruptcy. In addition, the study concludes that 
management artistry displayed by the board will significantly drive down the 
gearing position of listed firms in Nigeria. The study therefore recommends that 
firms should embrace a well established corporate governance structures that will 
assist them to gain easier access to credit at lower cost. 
 
This study is however limited by the fact that the sample only covers six years data 
from the Nigerian stock exchange market. Also, only four corporate governance 
variables were considered in the study. Future research could consider other 
corporate governance variables not considered in this study. 
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Appendix (1): Listed Firms of Selected Listed firms in the Nigerian Stock Exchange Market 
S/N List of selected listed Firms S/N List of selected listed Firms 
1 
Evans Medical Plc 
21 Cement Company of Northern 
(Nigeria) Plc 
2 G S K Consumer Plc 22 Ceramic Manufacturers Nigeria Plc  
3 May and Baker Nig. Plc 23 African Petroleum Plc 
4 Pharma - Deko Plc 24 Chevron  Oil Nigeria Plc 
5 Guinness Nigeria Plc 25 Mobile Oil Nigeria Plc 
6 Nigerian Breweries Plc 26 Conoil 
7 Jos International Breweries Plc 27 Oando Plc   
8 Champion Breweries Plc  28 Total Nigeria Plc  
9 International Breweries Plc   29 BOS Gases Plc 
10 Lafarge West African Portland 
Cement Plc  
30 African Paints (Nigeria) Plc 
11 Chemical & Allied Products Plc 31 Ecobank Plc 
12 D N Meyer Plc 32 First Bank Plc 
13 Nigerian - German Chemical Plc  33 Fidelity Bank 
14 Okitipupa Oil Palm Plc 34 Access Bank plc 
15 Presco Plc  35 First Bank of Nigeria plc 
16 Okomu Oil Palm Plc  36 First inland bank plc 
17 Ellah - Lakes Plc 37 Guaranty trust bank plc 
18 Livestock   Feeds Plc 38 Oceanic bank international plc 
19 Ashaka Cement Company Plc 39 Berger Paints Plc  
20 Benue Cement Company Plc    
(BCC) 
40 
BCN Plc 
 
